Israeli military and intelligence investigations reveal that Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif initially intended to launch their attack a full year earlier, during the Jewish High Holidays in September 2022. At that time, Israel faced the same intelligence lapses and defensive shortcomings as in the actual events of October 2023. Military leaders similarly assumed Hamas was deterred and posed no immediate threat.
However, one significant factor was different: the political leadership. In September 2022, the Israeli government was led by centrist Prime Minister Yair Lapid and his right-wing partner Naftali Bennett. Their fragile coalition, which included Mansour Abbas, leader of the Arab Ra’am party, had already lost its parliamentary majority months earlier. Benjamin Netanyahu, the country’s long-serving prime minister, was the opposition leader, preparing for elections just weeks away and promoting his newly published autobiography while anticipating victory.
Had Hamas attacked in September 2022, the consequences for Israeli politics would have been clear and dramatic. Netanyahu, ever the master politician, would have undoubtedly visited devastated communities in southern Israel shortly after the attack, publicly demanding accountability from Lapid and Bennett. The elections would have been postponed due to wartime conditions, and Lapid’s political coalition would have faced obliteration—forever branded as those whose alliance with Arab parties facilitated an unprecedented security disaster.
Netanyahu, despite having shaped Israel’s long-term Gaza strategy over many years, would have skillfully avoided accountability, as public anger typically targets those in direct control during crises. The result would likely have been a massive electoral victory for Netanyahu, consolidating his image as the sole leader who can guarantee Israeli security. His far-right political allies would have surged in support, and senior military officials responsible for defense failures would have faced swift dismissal.
Yet history unfolded differently. Hamas delayed its attack, allowing Netanyahu to return to power shortly before the devastating events of October 2023. Ironically, this placed him squarely at the helm and burdened him with responsibility. Consequently, Netanyahu now finds himself politically weakened, seen by many as the strategic architect whose policies indirectly empowered Hamas. Bennett, by contrast, has seen his popularity rise significantly in the wake of the crisis.
A year and a half after the tragedy, with elections looming in the not-too-distant future, what remains surprising is the lack of new political alternatives in Israel. Unlike after the 1973 Yom Kippur War—when a wave of public anger led to a political revolution—today’s Israelis find themselves repeatedly choosing between leaders deeply entangled in past failures. The hope for a fresh start remains elusive, leaving voters with the familiar yet frustrating choice akin to the advice often heard in tech support: “Have you tried turning it off and on again?”
The above is an excerpt from my Shabbat column in Yedioth Ahronoth.
